---
title: "Voting with time commitment for decentralized governance: Bond voting as a Sybil-resistant mechanism"
author: "Mohan, V.; Khezr, P.; Berg, C."
date: "2024-03-06"
url: "https://chrisberg.org/2024/03/voting-with-time-commitment-for-decentralized-governance-bond-voting-as-a-sybil-resistant-mechanism/"
type: "Journal articles"
published_in: "Management Science 70(12): 8709–8734"
doi: "10.1287/mnsc.2023.01536"
topics: "Blockchain governance, Democracy and elections"
---

# Voting with time commitment for decentralized governance: Bond voting as a Sybil-resistant mechanism

With Vijay Mohan and Peyman Khezr. [Published in *Management Science*,](https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01536) online March 2024. [Early version available at SSRN](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4259599)

**Abstract:**In this paper, we examine the usefulness of time commitment as a voting resource for decentralized governance when the identity of voters cannot be verified. In order to do so, we take a closer look at two issues that confront token-based voting systems used by blockchain communities and organizations: voter fraud through the creation of multiple identities (Sybil attack) and concentration of voting power in the hands of the wealthy (plutocracy). Our contribution is threefold: first, we lay analytical foundations for the formal modeling of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a voting system to be resistant to a Sybil attack; second, we show that tokens as the only instrument for weighting votes cannot simultaneously achieve resistance to both Sybil attacks and a plutocracy in the voting process; and third, we design a voting mechanism, bond voting, that is Sybil resistant and offers a second instrument (time commitment) that is effective for countering plutocracy when large token holders also have a relatively high opportunity cost of locking tokens for a vote. Overall, our paper emphasizes the importance of time-based suffrage in decentralized governance.

Not on this website yet. I have a [simple explainer of the bond voting mechanism](https://chrisbergaus.substack.com/p/using-time-to-make-better-collective) at Substack.