Blockchain governance
How blockchain networks, protocols and DAOs make, enforce and change their own rules: voting, treasuries, forks, upgrades, validators and on-chain constitutions.
Research 17
The Economics of Blockchain Shared SecurityAllen, D.W.E., Berg, C. and Davidson, S. (2026) · in Cryptoeconomic Theory, World Scientific, pp. 35–51DAOs Are Adaptive Governance EnginesAllen, D.W., Berg, C., Lane, A.M. and Potts, J. (2026) · in Foundations of Decentralized Organizations, Oxford University Press, pp. 123–140The Blockchain Treasury Governance DilemmaAllen, D.W.E., Berg, C. and Lane, A.M. (2025) · Regulation & Governance 19(3): 761–776Open problems in DAOsBerg, C., Tan, J., Merk, T., Hubbard, S., Oak, E.R. et al. (2024) · Working paper, arXivTowards legal recognition of Decentralised Autonomous OrganisationsAllen, D.W.E., Berg, C. and Lane, A.M. (2024) · Australian Business Law Review 52: 96–116Voting with time commitment for decentralized governance: Bond voting as a Sybil-resistant mechanismMohan, V., Khezr, P. and Berg, C. (2024) · Management Science 70(12): 8709–8734The exchange theory of web3 governanceAllen, D.W.E., Berg, C., Lane, A.M., MacDonald, T. and Potts, J. (2023) · Kyklos 76(4): 659–675Trust and Governance in Collective Blockchain TreasuriesBerg, C., Allen, D.W.E. and Lane, A.M. (2021) · Working paper, SSRNAn economic theory of blockchain foundationsPotts, J., Allen, D.W.E., Berg, C., Davidson, S. and MacDonald, T. (2021) · Working paper, SSRNRentseeking in blockchain governance: the awkward transition from market decisionmaking to non-market decisionmakingBerg, C. (2021) · Working paper, SSRN
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Commitment voting: a mechanism for intensity of preference revelation and long-term commitment in blockchain governanceBerg, C., Davidson, S. and Potts, J. (2020) · Working paper, SSRNBlockchain Governance: What we can Learn from the Economics of Corporate GovernanceAllen, D.W.E. and Berg, C. (2020) · Journal of the British Blockchain Association 3(1)Blockchains and Constitutional CatallaxyBerg, A., Berg, C. and Novak, M. (2020) · Constitutional Political Economy 31(2): 188–204Blockchains as Constitutional OrdersBerg, C., Davidson, S. and Potts, J. (2018) · in Wagner, R.E. (eds) James M. Buchanan: A Theorist of Political Economy and Social Philosophy, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 383–397Crypto Public ChoiceBerg, A., Berg, C. and Novak, M. (2018) · Working paper, SSRNCryptodemocracy and its institutional possibilitiesAllen, D.W.E., Berg, C., Lane, A.M. and Potts, J. (2018) · The Review of Austrian Economics 33(3): 363–374Delegation and Unbundling in a Crypto-DemocracyBerg, C. (2017) · Working paper, SSRN
