Don’t Blame Voters For A Lack Of Competition Reform

Malcolm Turnbull should count himself lucky. Tony Abbott has handed his successor a remarkably fleshed out agenda for economic reform.

Shortly after the 2013 election, Abbott and Joe Hockey commissioned a series of reviews and inquiries. There was one on the financial sector, which reported in December last year. A federation inquiry and a tax inquiry are both working their way through the system.

And then there was the inquiry into competition policy, headed by the economist Ian Harper, which released its final report in March 2015.

The last major competition policy inquiry was the Hilmer Report under the Keating government in 1993. That report laid the groundwork for half a decade of competition policy reform. Hockey to his credit knew what he was doing when he commissioned a sequel to Hilmer.

It’s easy to forget all these reviews. The Abbott government was so policy shy in its last 12 months. The Harper review sunk like a stone almost as soon as it was released.

Only one of the Harper recommendations was seriously considered by the Abbott government – the so-called “effects test”, which would have made it easier to penalise firms for “lessening” competition.

The effects test divided the Abbott cabinet. It is the only major recommendation from the Harper review that would constitute an increase in regulatory interventionism. The free market right hated it. Small business minister Bruce Billson was the effects test’s biggest advocate. He was dropped from the ministry when Turnbull took over. We can speculate that this was not a total coincidence.

So when Scott Morrison announced on Friday that the Turnbull Government was going to look again at the Harper review, he was wading into a deep pool.

Morrison did not commit to the effects test either way. He did, however, specifically note the much more ambitious proposals in the Harper review: reforms to urban planning and zoning to open up the housing market, and subjecting social services to competition.

All good stuff. But it will be a hell of a challenge to implement any of these proposals. It’s true that the Coalition now has a minister for cities. But all functional power in planning and urban policy lies with state governments, who created the disastrous land supply restrictions that caused the housing mess in the first place.

Likewise, the Commonwealth can cajole and bully all it likes but the ultimate responsibility for most service delivery is in the hands of the states. Very little marketisation of social services is going to go ahead unless state governments buy in.

Last week we had an even more glaring illustration of the institutional barriers to competition reform. The Harper Review put particular emphasis on taxi deregulation and removing barriers to the ride-sharing firm Uber. But on Monday the Commonwealth’s independent competition regulator the ACCC provisionally denied the taxi industry authorisation to launch a smartphone app, iHail.

The iHail app would have allowed users to book the closest taxi from participating taxi networks. The ACCC thought that this would reduce competition in the taxi sector because it was a joint venture between a number of taxi networks. You can read their draft determination.

The ACCC’s arguments don’t even pass the laugh test. There is virtually no competition between taxi providers right now. Indeed, we’ve had a century of regulation with the express purpose of eliminating competition between taxis. The only real competition that is exists is between taxis and ride-sharing services like Uber.

But the ACCC has decided that, because the legality of Uber is still unclear, for the purposes of competition law taxis do not compete with Uber. (You can see this rather astonishing claim on page 21 of the draft determination.)

Therefore the ACCC believes that taxi companies collaborating on an app endangers the taxi market – rather than being an example of how competition from Uber is encouraging taxis to offer a better service.

Malcolm Turnbull and Scott Morrison should be looking at this draft decision closely. Not because its specifics are particularly important. The ACCC might well change its mind on the scope of taxi competition before it releases a final determination. And as the Harper review noted, even a completely deregulated taxi market reform would do little to boost total Australian productivity.

But Harper thought taxi deregulation was important because failure to do so symbolised a lack of seriousness in competition policy. The ACCC draft determination is important. It’s a warning. We now have a legal framework where firms have to request permission from the government to innovate.

In an influential short book, the American technology scholar Adam Thierer argued for “permissionless innovation”. Thierer argues that if we want take advantage of technological progress, we must remove the approvals, authorisations and clearances that innovators and entrepreneurs need from government before they bring ideas to market.

For years commentators have complained that the era of economic reform is over. In the most common version of this story, any attempt to restructure the Australian economy will be scuttled by a hostile Australian public. This is really just blaming voters for the failures of the political class.

In fact, what is more likely to hold back economic reform is government itself: the network of interests and institutions that believe their job is to supervise the innovation economy.

Alcohol And The Nanny State Inquiry: This Isn’t Just About Money

It’s one of the most cited numbers in Australian politics: alcohol costs Australia $36 billion every year in preventable death, illness, inquiry and lost productivity.

Unsurprisingly it has become a centrepiece of the Senate inquiry into personal choice and community impacts – you might know it as the “nanny state” inquiry – which began its hearings last month.

In their submissions to the inquiry, the Australian Medical Association, the Alcohol Policy Coalition, the Foundation for Alcohol Research and Education, the Public Health Association of Australia, the Royal Australasian College of Physicians, and the Australasian College for Emergency Medicine all cite the $36 billion figure to variously justify higher taxes on alcohol, or more controls over alcohol supply, marketing and licensed venues.

The media loves this number, mainly because they love big numbers.

Public health activists and academics love this number too, because they hate being called nanny staters and wowsers. The $36 billion figure is useful because it purports to take the question of whether government should regulate people’s personal choices out of the domain of morality and philosophy and into the domain of economics and rationality.

But it is absolutely meaningless in any policy-relevant way.

And it ironically reveals how philosophical questions cannot be separated from the debate over paternalistic restrictions on alcohol.

The figure comes from a 2010 study conducted by the Alcohol Education and Rehabilitation Foundation.

The 13 authors of the paper came to $36 billion by piling on as many “costs” of alcohol as they could imagine. They took the full kitchen sink approach. They included everything from the lost productivity of workers affected by alcohol, to the cost of hospitalisation of children who have been abused by adults believed to be affected by alcohol.

Even where the connection to alcohol is tenuous – the fact that some crimes are committed by people who have alcohol in their system does not mean that alcohol causes those crimes – they derived costs and added them into the big headline number.

It is a credit to their creativity that the authors managed to add a further $20 billion to the $15 billion social cost of alcohol found by a study published by the Commonwealth government in 2008.

But the policy question is not whether alcohol consumption has costs. All choices have costs. The question is whether those costs outweigh the benefits from alcohol consumption. Costs are meaningless if they are not paired against benefits.

And as the economists Eric Crampton, Matt Burgess and Brad Taylor point out in an important paper, these sorts of social cost studies dismiss the benefits of alcohol by leaning heavily on an assumption that drinkers are uninformed or irrational, and therefore do not really “benefit” from drinking.

It’s a revealing move, because it shows how even this most rationalistic and economistic argument for alcohol regulation ultimately comes down to an assertion that people just don’t know what’s good for them – and that others do.

In fact, as the 2008 study found, the direct costs to the public healthcare system of alcohol consumption are much more modest: about $2 billion a year. This might still seem like a lot. But the government received more than twice that from the excise on alcohol sales: $5.2 billion.

You often hear in debates about paternalism that the government wouldn’t care about what we ate or drank if it weren’t for the fact that taxpayers pay for the consequences of those choices through the public health system. Hence we need to regulate alcohol and reduce alcohol consumption for the budget’s sake.

Even if the excise on alcohol didn’t more than recover the direct healthcare costs of alcohol, this would still be one of the most counterproductive arguments in politics.

First, the argument suggests that a public health system is incapable of handling the freely-made health choices of its customers. Second, it suggests that the corollary of public health provision is state control over our bodies and what we choose to put in our bodies. And third, it suggests that there is no “right” to public health care – rather that access to health care is contingent on making the correct health decisions.

Far from being a defence of the nanny state, this argument looks like a rather powerful attack on the notion of a publicly funded and universal health care system. I’m guessing this is not the intention.

Helping launch the nanny state inquiry last month Sam Dastyari told the ABC that “ideology has just been dead in Australia for too long. Let’s actually have some big debates, let’s have some different views”.

Like it or not, the debate about restricting what we drink, eat and otherwise consume cannot avoid ultimately considering deeper philosophical questions about the relationship between individual and government.

Tax Reform A False Start In Pursuit Of Economic Growth

The new Turnbull government should stop talking about tax reform.

Tax reform is a poor use of its political capital. It is a waste of the goodwill Malcolm Turnbull brings to the prime ministership. The challenge Turnbull faces is not to make our tax system slightly more efficient. The challenge he faces is how to make the economy grow.

When he became Treasurer, Scott Morrison stated that the Commonwealth has a spending problem, not a revenue problem. That is, the government wants to focus on spending cuts rather than tax increases.

This is excellent, as far as it goes. But in truth our real problem is growth.

The International Monetary Fund estimates that the Australian economy is going to grow just 2.5 per cent this year. Back in the Howard years, growth averaged 3.7 per cent a year. The Reserve Bank governor has publicly speculated that our lower growth might be the new normal.

If you want to blame the stubborn budget deficit on anything, blame it on this. John Howard, Kevin Rudd, Julia Gillard, Tony Abbott, Malcolm Turnbull: they’ve all been riding the waves of our growth figures.

Some governments have made the problem better and some have made it worse, but the simple fact is that policymakers can no longer rely on the same level of growth that once delivered windfalls to the Commonwealth budget.

The focus on tax is a distraction. Ever since Kevin Rudd commissioned his own Treasury Secretary to conduct a “root and branch” investigation of Australia’s tax system in 2008, tax reform has been an obsession of governments. Joe Hockey was only following Labor’s lead when he launched the Coalition’s tax reform process.

It is true that the tax system could be made more economically efficient. It would be more efficient for taxes on income to be further replaced by taxes on consumption. This is why many economists have said that the GST should be raised and personal and company tax reduced. Morrison has been talking about this possible trade-off already.

But it’s hard to see why this is a national priority. Efficiency isn’t the only thing we want from a tax system. Indeed, a theoretical insistence on efficiency was what gave us the Rudd government’s mining tax; a tax which was understood by a tiny fraction of the population but was the inexplicable and unhappy centrepiece of Labor’s economic agenda.

And while efficiency makes it easier for governments to extract more money out of us, is that really such a virtue? We ought to know when we are being taxed. Voters need to know what their government is doing. They need to know how taxes are raising the prices of the goods they buy and reducing the money they have to buy those goods.

A budget emergency is the worst time to conduct tax reform. There’s not a person in the country who believes the economy will escape this round of tax reform with a lower total tax burden.

Every incentive in the Treasury department is to edge taxes up. That’s why Joe Hockey cracked down on so-called corporate tax “avoidance”. That’s why the GST is now to be levied on online purchases. And anybody who thinks eliminating superannuation “concessions” will help the economy has rocks in their head.

It’s all incredibly counterproductive because the fixation on revenue and tax increases actually holds back the growth we need to encourage. Taxes take money out of the productive parts of the economy. Perhaps the government thinks it might be able to use its revenue to lay the foundations of growth – by investing in infrastructure and private education. In practice, too much of this investment goes to white elephants and degree mills.

Governments – directed as they are by professional politicians with their eyes on marginal seats and swinging voters – aren’t that good at spending our money wisely. Turnbull needs to be careful his interest in innovation doesn’t become a stream of taxpayer-funded boondoggles. Much better to revitalise the Coalition’s flagging deregulation agenda, refocus on industrial relations, and eliminate any regulatory burdens holding back employment and production.

Even the constant drumbeat of tax reform is likely to be harming growth. We’ve been talking about tax reform for nearly a decade. Uncertainty about Australia’s future tax regime makes companies less eager to invest. They know the tax system is probably going to change. They don’t know when, or how.

But there’s a deeper reason Turnbull should fixate on growth rather than taxes. Higher growth means increased living standards. Higher growth means a more prosperous Australia and more prosperous Australians. This – not spending, not revenue – should be what keeps Malcolm Turnbull and Scott Morrison awake at night.

The Tide Is Turning On Penalty Rates, But How Far Will Turnbull Go?

All the ducks are lining up for changes to penalty rates under the Turnbull Government.

First, there’s political momentum: the employment minister Michaelia Cash is open to changing to penalty rates. The Energy and Resources Minister Josh Frydenberg supports changes.

Warren Entsch, Dan Tehan, Russell Broadbent, Wyatt Roy, Sean Edwards, Craig Laundy, Alex Hawke, George Christensen, Dennis Jensen, Zed Seselja and Andrew Nikolic support changes.

Obviously aware of this drum beat, Malcolm Turnbull has signalled he is open to penalty rate reform.

Second: penalty rate reform is backed by analysis that looks both independent and authoritative. The Productivity Commission’s draft report into Australia’s Workplace Relations Framework, released in August, recommended that penalty rates for Sundays be reduced to the same rates as those on Saturday for hospitality and retail workers. The PC argues this would boost both employment and consumer choice on Sundays. (The PC’s final report will appear in November.)

Third: penalty rate reform might not be that challenging a contest. Bill Shorten is hardly up to the task of a debate on minor industrial relations changes. Yesterday he claimed penalty rates were the difference between parents sending their children to a public school or a private school.

Clearly, WorkChoices hyperbole infects both sides.

It’s been a decade since the Howard government announced WorkChoices in May 2005. The penalty rates debate is deeply symbolic. Being able to move, even in a small way, on penalty rates would be a major arrow in Malcolm Turnbull’s quiver. Industrial relations has always been the high ground of economic policy in this country.

In fact, reducing Sunday penalty rates would be a very minor reform. The Productivity Commission is usually parodied as a bunch of dry-as-dust economic rationalists. But their penalty rates recommendation is hardly revolutionary. They have rejected any change to penalty rates for long hours or night work. And workers not employed in the entertainment, retail and hospitality industries would keep their Sunday rates.

Indeed, their whole workplace relations report is cloyingly moderate.

Take, for instance, the PC’s conclusions on the minimum wage. Back in January the PC wanted to prove once and for all whether minimum wages cost employment. (I wrote about this ambition in The Drum at the time.) Yet the draft report concludes “it is not possible to pinpoint the impacts of minimum wages on employment”. And despite admitting that the minimum wage mainly favours middle income households and there are better anti-poverty devices than the minimum wage, it believes that the minimum wage is good policy.

More generally, the PC report holds firmly to the idea that there is unequal bargaining power between employers and employees thanks to labour market “frictions” – things like how hard it is to find new work. (Without those frictions employees would play firms off against each other for higher wages.)

The PC does nothing to challenge the popular belief that unregulated labour markets are unfair to workers. Quite the opposite: the PC implicitly agrees with the union movement that the world of employment is characterised by exploitation and inequality.

The PC should have challenged that belief.

Labour economists often say that labour is unlike any other commodity because many low wage labour markets are characterised by “monopsonistic competition”. This refers to situations where buyers have quasi-monopoly power and can effectively set wages in their favour.

But every commodity is unlike any other commodity. While the idea of monopsonistic competition is an interesting theory, it is hard to see how such competition would be sustained in the real world, where every market imperfection is an opportunity for entrepreneurial disruption.

To be fair to the PC, they’re reflecting a stream of economic scholarship published in the last two decades that seems to suggest labour markets function in this strange way.

But that scholarship is the centre of an extremely active debate. Nor is there any consensus on what the strange behaviour of this market might mean for labour market law.

After all, regulation can create monopsony effects. In this sense, labour market regulation is a self-fulfilling prophecy. When you make it harder to hire and fire workers, you might create the frictions that reduce workers’ bargaining power. That lesser bargaining power means we need to regulate hiring and firing even more. And round it goes.

Nobody expects the Turnbull Government to push radical labour market deregulation right now. We’re having a penalty rates debate precisely because it is such a small area of dispute.

After all, the PC only called for aligning Sunday penalty rates for entertainment, hospitality and retail workers with the Saturday rate.

Under Tony Abbott the Coalition government wasn’t even game to consider that. Abbott and his industrial relations minister Eric Abetz ran a mile when the PC released its draft report.

If Turnbull can’t bring in this small change, then the possibilities for more substantial labour market reform in the future are slim indeed.

Turnbull Can Learn From Gillard’s Transition

It feels like a new Government, so different is the changed tone from Tony Abbott to Malcolm Turnbull. Yet tone counts for little in any policy sense.

The new Prime Minister may brag about a boost in business confidence but markets don’t run on tone. Optimism can dissipate quickly.

Turnbull’s challenge right now is in many ways a lot harder than that faced by a newly formed government. Just ask Julia Gillard.

A new government carries into office a folder full of election promises. A new government is free to discover the disastrous state of the books, to uncover the horrifying truth about major programs, and just generally remind voters they made the right electoral choice.

Turnbull can do none of that. He both inherits the accumulated decisions of his predecessor and is unable to disinherit them – even if he wanted to. First, half his cabinet signed off on those decisions, including himself. Second, maintaining the decisions of the Abbott government was one of his promises to get into power.

Yet despite limiting his criticism of Abbott before the spill to Abbott’s failure to communicate on economic matters, it is clear that Turnbull wants to alter policy. Hence his recent lines that all policy is subject to scrutiny.

It has been blindingly obvious for months that Turnbull’s issues with Abbott were not limited to his communication style. Take Turnbull’s anti-“death cult” speech from July – while couched in a criticism of the government’s language, it was as clear a signal of policy dissent from a cabinet minister we’ve seen.

Anyway, the policy direction of the Government would have had to change regardless of who is leader. The 2015 budget was a purposeless document unsuited to the times. The Abbott government had been in constant policy retreat ever since the failed spill attempt in February. This was unsustainable.

So right now we’re in a peculiar limbo.

A number of critics of Turnbull have pointed out that his much-praised communications skills can often devolve into waffle – something that was most obvious in his interview with Leigh Sales on 7.30 last week. Policy uncertainty is why Turnbull waffles.

When Turnbull has something to say he is sharp and clear. But the Government hasn’t settled on what to say yet. Indeed, policy change can’t happen quickly if everything has to go to cabinet along with formal submissions.

So when asked about – say – his foreign policy priorities, the Prime Minister fills the air, trying to be interesting rather than decisive. When he defends positions against his better judgment – like the gay marriage plebiscite – he looks unconvinced and unconvincing.

It’s a fine rope to walk, to distance yourself from the prime minister you rolled and still defend their legacy.

How this is done can make or break a government. To say that in 2010 Gillard handled the transition poorly would be an understatement. Voters were never offered any explanation for why Kevin Rudd had to be removed. We were told a “good government had lost its way” but we were not told where the government was supposed to be heading. We were supposed to “move forward” because asking questions about the leadership change would be crass.

Eventually we found out that Rudd had been rolled because his office was disorganised. Politics is a tough business.

Gillard kept policy change to a minimum. She renegotiated the mining tax. She promised to rearticulate the case for Labor’s moribund climate change policy. Keeping Rudd’s cabinet exactly in place underscored a sense of continuity, giving the impression that toppling the prime minister was simply a minor adjustment to the status quo. When she called an election without affecting any substantial policy change, the sense of surrealism was enhanced.

Gillard scraped through 2010 but never recovered from the impression she made in her first days as prime minister.

Turnbull should be studying the Gillard years closely for what not to do. Not only does a new prime minister need to accumulate the power of incumbency – to be prime minister and be seen being prime minister – but they need time to shape the government in their own image.

More importantly, Turnbull needs to bed down all those questions about where his government will differ from Abbott’s. That means working out all those awkward questions about how and whether asylum policy will change, whether climate policy will change, where the government stands on tax reform, the deficit and spending cuts. Those changes will tell an implicit story of why the spill had to occur when it did.

We’re still in a transition period, as one government turns into another government. But as Gillard discovered, this is one of the most dangerous places to be.

Our New ‘Innovation PM’ Needs Policies To Match

While it’s wonderful to hear the new Prime Minister wax lyrical about disruption and productivity, the real test will be putting some policy flesh on those rhetorical bones.

The recently ousted treasurer, Joe Hockey, used to talk a lot about innovation and disruption, and in much the same language as Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull did announcing his new ministry.

Innovation was Hockey’s theme addressing the National Reform Summit in August. At a small business summit in July he declared that “global disruption is the new black”. When he addressed the Institute of Public Affairs in March, he marvelled at the possibilities and challenges of Uber, Airbnb and ASOS.

But for all that oratory, Hockey’s policy for these new firms was simply to bring them into the GST net, as happened with Uber and all online purchases.

And it’s not immediately obvious what the ideal role for government in innovation is.

We already sponsor, support and subsidise science, engineering, technology, invention and innovation in many different ways. The research and development tax incentive offsets R&D costs against corporate taxation. The patent system is meant to give inventors an incentive to invent things. In 2001 the government introduced an “innovation patent” for incremental changes to business practice.

The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) receives $750 million a year to conduct scientific research for the good of industry and encourage commercialisation. Then there’s all the money we give to universities for research – which Ian MacFarlane, the now-former industry minister, wanted to tie to commercialisation.

Innovation policy can easily become as much a boondoggle as any Alice to Darwin railway. State governments have been burning money on wasteful “innovation” policies for decades. Every new premier wants their capital to become Silicon Valley. But who now remembers ComTechPort?

We actually know very little about why economies innovate, let alone how we might encourage them to innovate more.

Take the oldest innovation policy on the books – the patent system. Patents might in fact discourage innovation as much as they encourage innovation. In the classical model of innovation market failure, inventors won’t invest in inventing unless they are protected from free-riders copying their invention for a period of time. Hence patents offer a temporary monopoly.

But if that monopoly is too long or too strict it could prevent new inventions leap-frogging old ones, or prevent inventions being adopted across the economy. We have no reason to believe governments have struck the correct balance here.

Last month the Productivity Commission launched an inquiry into intellectual property. Hopefully under the Turnbull Government this inquiry might be able to make a difference.

My colleague Sinclair Davidson has challenged the idea that there is a market failure even in basic scientific research. The assumptions underpinning the standard blackboard arguments for market failure in science do not hold up. He finds that government spending on science is probably a net drain on the economy – despite the fantastic claims of supporters of science spending.

Whether you accept this or not, the fact remains that while we know that technology and innovation is at the heart of economic growth, there’s no off-the-shelf policy to suit.

Refashioning 1970s-style industry policy with a technology and science focus isn’t going to cut it. Christopher Pyne should be cautious with his new role as Minister for Industry, Innovation and Science. The position could easily become a useless financial black hole.

What’s more prospective is Turnbull’s focus on the “rapidly changing, disruptive environment”.

Ever since he launched his challenge, you get the impression he’s been restraining himself from blurting out “Uber” at every press conference. Over the last year both sides of politics have been trying to grab the future-y high ground of the sharing economy (like Labor’s Andrew Leigh, Clare O’Neil and Tim Watts).

But the lesson of sharing economy firms like Uber is that innovation comes from below. The political battle we’re seeing now between Uber and the taxi industry is a peek at a future where technology butts up against regulation – and the wealthy economic interests that regulation supports.

At the very least a focus on disruption and change is a base on which Turnbull can revitalise the Government’s lagging deregulation agenda. Not just because deregulation will save firms money, as the Abbott government argued, but because it will unleash their potential.

But it’s also a firm intellectual base on which Turnbull can pursue his broader innovation agenda.

Rather than looking to pour more money into government commercialisation and science programs, the new Prime Minister should be looking at this issue from the other side of the glass. What does the Government do right now that prevents industry from innovating itself?

Turnbull opened his bid for leadership with an argument: “Our values of free enterprise, of individual initiative, of freedom, this is what you need to be a successful, agile economy in 2015”.

Fine, heartening words. But it will be quite a trick to turn those words into a reform agenda, let alone a productivity boost.

Without Economic Nous, Abbott Was Doomed

Tony Abbott has never had a taste for economics, and that ultimately was his downfall.

It wasn’t the gaffes, or the self-indulgences, or his loyalty to Bronwyn Bishop, or the aimlessness of the Government since the last budget that led to yesterday’s drama. Each of these could be survived.

It was that his attempts to reset the agenda on “jobs and growth” were empty. It was the right message – finally the right message after so much flailing about. But it was a message without any substance. People don’t want to hear politicians talk about “jobs and growth”. They want actual jobs and actual growth. At the very least they want a credible story about how those jobs and growth will be achieved.

By people here, I mean both the voters and the parliamentary Liberal Party. There is no one in the party room, apart from Joe Hockey apparently, who has really believed for the last six months that the Abbott Government has a jobs plan and that plan is working.

In the back of their mind, this economic vacuum was laying the foundation for a devastating election loss.

For any other government the China-Australia free trade deal would be a minor diplomatic success. For the Abbott Government it became, by necessity, the great lynchpin of Australia’s future posterity.

The Government announced in August that its plan for South Australian jobs was to build ship after ship after ship for the Navy. This is the sort of big government industry policy that would make Labor traditionalists like Kim Carr proud. Government funded ship building is not a plan for growth.

Here so much of the blame for Abbott’s fall has to be laid on his loyalty to his Treasurer. The 2014 budget needed a story and an advocate. But it had no one who could explain the budget’s rationale – outside the old opposition cry of Labor’s debt and deficits – or how it fit into the big economic picture. Abbott wasn’t interested in it. Hockey seemed embarrassed by it.

Liberal parliamentarians knew when they voted last night against Abbott they were casting a proxy vote against Hockey. Abbott has goodwill in the party room. He was an incredibly strong opposition leader. He is an incredibly strong campaigner. Hockey has no such goodwill. An Abbott without his Hockey might have survived.

For the last six months I’ve been reading that Abbott’s parliamentary support was entirely resting on the “right”. This is probably how it has looked from the press gallery, as conservative positions on national security and gay marriage became central to the party room numbers.

But the right wasn’t a very stable platform. Abbott’s relationship with the right has been complicated at best.

Yes, Abbott’s rise to the leadership was on the back of Malcolm Turnbull’s support for Kevin Rudd’s emissions trading scheme, and it was the right that resigned in protest, sparking the leadership challenge.

But this support was first tested early on by the paid parental leave scheme – Abbott’s first exercise of the leader’s prerogative. When he abandoned this policy in February to protect himself, it showed he was willing to Year Zero his own leadership in the same way Rudd did with the emissions trading scheme in 2010.

The most devastating blow for his support among the right was abandoning the promise to repeal section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act in August 2014. The press gallery has never understood how significant this original promise was to Abbott’s prime ministership. Abandoning it – and describing free speech as a “needless complication” no less – was very damaging. Abbott came to realise this. Hence his strong words in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo massacre.

The final test of his relationship with the right was yet to come. His personal support for Indigenous recognition in the Australian Constitution – deliberate constitutional amendment for an uncertain and entirely symbolic end – would have torn his base apart.

Without a credible economic story, without a credible treasurer, and without stable support from the right, Abbott was going to go. Whether this week or next month or next year.

So what does this assessment mean for the new Prime Minister? Obviously Turnbull’s message before and after the spill was that he would bring a renewed focus on the economy. But two phrases stuck out in his press conferences last night. Turnbull chooses his words carefully.

The first was the declarative emphasis on “freedom” as a key to economic growth. The echo of the language of George Brandis and Tony Abbott’s “freedom agenda” in opposition was surely not accidental – and all the more powerful for now being used in the service of economics.

The second was his statement that his would be a “thoroughly liberal government” (assuming he meant “liberal” as opposed to “Liberal”). It’s indicative Turnbull said this publicly after the vote, not before. Abbott’s was an intentionally conservative government. Abbott sought to remake the party into a conservative party.

What these statements mean for government policy is anyone’s guess. Turnbull has promised not to pursue higher climate targets, and he has apparently reaffirmed the plebiscite plan for gay marriage. Turnbull proposes a new tone, but has no agenda that we are aware of. It’s going to be a long road from here.

At the very least, his choice of language is an unsubtle reminder that Turnbull will have to navigate the Liberal Party with far more skill and diplomacy than he did when he was opposition leader.

The Abbott Government’s Real Problem Is That It’s Not Ideological Enough

The Abbott Government is getting bad reviews. This week’s two year anniversary offers a neat little hook for members of the press gallery to take stock of the Government’s performance.

Among the unforced errors and stumbles, we read that the Abbott Government is far too “ideological”. In an encyclopaedic piece, the Guardian’s Lenore Taylor bemoans their “ideological overreach”. This is indeed an old complaint. This time last year Liberal Party strategists were counselling the government “no more ideology”.

But if the Abbott Government is too ideological, then its ideology is of a new species hitherto unknown to political taxonomists.

It’s an ideology that prioritises convenience over consistency, and refuses to spell out the principles which guide its decision-making. That is, the Abbott Government appears to have no distinct “ideology” at all.

One should not be too critical of a government for failing to hem to abstract doctrine – democratic government functions through compromise and conciliation. Political philosophy has to give way to practicality.

Yet even on these forgiving standards, it’s hard to see what picture of the world – or vision of the future – animates the Coalition.

The Government’s apparent “war” on the ABC is often used as Exhibit A for its ideological fervour. This began very early in their term. It seems to have reached its zenith with the prolonged Zaky Mallah affair.

Yet consider the absence of any consideration in this “war” of the role of public broadcasting in an age of media diversity, any critique of the media as a public good, or even a simple comment on the trade-off between ABC funding and lower taxes.

Rather, the Government’s critique of the ABC seems to be nothing more complex than that the public broadcaster has too many left-wing journalists and is insufficiently pro-Australia. Perhaps fair enough. But if this counts as “ideology”, then it is a superficial and empty ideology.

The irony of the Zaky Mallah affair was that it trivialised the substance and intractability of the modern terror threat by making it about the internal organisational structure of the ABC.

A keener focus on the principles at stake – that is, a more ideological approach – might have left the Abbott Government looking less like it was defeated by a chat show.

Taking a more ideological approach in each of these cases would have made the Government seem less obviously self-interested.

Nor has the criticism of the Human Rights Commission chief Gillian Triggs been obviously connected to any ideological perspective on human rights or the Human Rights Commission. The early promise of a debate from the top about the nature of human rights that was the appointment of Tim Wilson to the commission and the establishment of the Law Reform Commission’s inquiry into “traditional rights and freedoms” has gone unfulfilled.

Likewise, any pretence of a serious industrial relations agenda has been abandoned to focus on the Trade Union Royal Commission. The royal commission has revealed some serious wrong-doing in the union movement, and continues to highlight the Labor Party’s relationship with unions. But it is hardly a substitute for a debate about how much the state should be involved in workplace contracts.

Taking a more ideological approach in each of these cases would have made the Government seem less obviously self-interested.

Exhibit B for too-much-ideology is the 2014 budget. Here we have to distinguish between the Commission of Audit – which reported just before the budget was released – and the budget itself.

At the time, the two blurred into one. And it is certainly the case that the Commission of Audit was deeply ideological, in the sense that it applied philosophical principles to policy questions, and did so in a way hopeless ideologues like myself could admire.

But there was little trace of that ideology in the budget.

If Christopher Pyne’s legislative agenda is too ideological for the Australian public to forgive, then the scope of future reform is truly limited.

The two standouts in the budget were the $7 co-payment and the higher education reforms. Only the latter was really ambitious. The Government made the former seem more ideological than it was. For all their banging on about a “price signal”, the co-payment revenue was to be funnelled into a research fund. This hardly counts as devolving health provision to the market mechanism. Neoliberal Friedmanism it ain’t.

Credit where credit is due for higher education. This was – or still is to be – a significant change to the way higher education is funded.

Yet it’s hard to see how the reforms being proposed are really of an order of magnitude greater than previous market-based reforms to tertiary education under past Coalition and Labor governments.

If Christopher Pyne’s legislative agenda is too ideological for the Australian public to forgive, then the scope of future reform – from any side of politics, on any philosophical grounds – is truly limited.

Ideology is of course endemic to all human thought. We all have our frames through which we understand the world. A non-ideological person is a conceptual impossibility.

Yet it is not ideological overreach which plagues the Abbott Government. The Coalition lacks exactly what a clearly ideological approach would give them: not just consistency or narrative, but purpose.

I know nobody who manned polling booths for the Coalition in 2013 in order for Joe Hockey to introduce first a deficit levy, then (as is now being seriously proposed) swap a higher GST for lower income taxes.

Two years into their three-year term, voters must be scratching their heads wondering what this Government is for. That is not a sign of too much ideology. It’s a sign of too little.

Free speech lost in translation

Ten years ago in September 2005, the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published twelve cartoons and sparked what the Danish prime minister described as the worst crisis in Danish foreign policy since the Second World War.

In his book, The Tyranny of Silence: How One Cartoon Ignited A Global Debate on the Future of Free Speech, Danish journalist Flemming Rose compellingly outlines what happened, and what the events meant for the fight for liberty in free and unfree countries.

In 2005 Rose was the culture editor of Jyllands-Posten. He commissioned and published the cartoons in his section of the paper. And it was Rose who, more than anyone else, bore the brunt of the backlash — as well as being the most prominent defender of the decision to publish. First published in Denmark in 2010, his book was written at first to justify his actions and respond to critics. It has just been republished by the American free market think tank the Cato Institute, but developed into a longer discourse about free speech and censorship.

The purpose of the cartoons was to take a position in favour of free expression, and to editorialise against self-censorship in Denmark. The Jyllands-Posten editorial team were interested in the fact that a Danish children’s author, Kåre Bluitgen, had only been able to get an illustrator for his book on the life of Muhammad if the illustrations were done anonymously. In the middle of a Danish debate on self-censorship, this was an opportunity for the paper to take a stand: not a stunt, or an experiment, but a statement of principles.

Most strands of Islam are aniconic: that is, they oppose the depiction of images of their god and their Prophet Muhammad. Yet the question facing Jyllands-Posten was not whether Islam, as practiced in by Europe’s muslim migrant communities or the Islamic world, was aniconic. Rather it was whether the prohibition on depicting Muhammad was to be applied to non-Muslims in a non-Muslim country. Some potential illustrators for Bluitgen’s book had contacted Islamic religious and academic authorities in Denmark, who had given the project an all clear (at least one of those authorities, Rose notes, took a lead in the anti-cartoon reaction).

The twelve cartoons were published on 30 September 2005. Not all of them depicted Muhammad. At least two caricatured Kåre Bluitgen, suggesting the whole affair was a publicity stunt. Another was of a school child going by the name of ‘Mohammed’ — implicitly mocking Jyllands-Posten. But the most provocative cartoons directly connected Muhammad with terrorism. One — possibly the most iconic — was a picture of Muhammad’s face with a lit bomb in his turban. On the bomb was the Islamic creed ‘shahadah’. Others cartoonists offered more neutral portraits. One showed a cartoonist looking over his shoulder as he nervously drew the Prophet — also a comment on the Jyllands-Posten commission about free speech. All the cartoons were printed around a comment piece by Rose discussing the cartoons’ publication as a statement against self-censorship and in defence of freedom of speech.

In 2015 political backlashes are almost instantaneous. The cycle of outrage, counter-outrage and resolution can be completed within 24 hours. Ten years ago — that is, before social media drowned out the public sphere — political outrage took more time to build up.

Some newspaper sellers declined to sell the issue of Jyllands-Posten on the day. A few days after the publication, a group of Muslim leaders and activists agreed to take political and legal action against the paper. Two weeks later 3,500 Danish Muslims peacefully protested the cartoons’ publication. And there the reaction stalled. As the Danish scholar Jytte Klausen writes, ‘there was no groundswell of support for the mosque activists and imams who led the charge against the newspaper and the government in Denmark.’

It was the international events that brought the crisis to a head. As part of their political campaign against the paper, the Danish imams had petitioned the ambassadors of Muslim countries in Denmark to raise the cartoons as a diplomatic issue with the Danish government. In October 2005, a diplomatic protest was lodged by the ambassadors of eleven countries, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Indonesia. Their protest was acknowledged by the Danish government. But the Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, head of a centre-right coalition, affirmed the paper’s right to free expression.

Feeling themselves unsupported, the imams decided to directly appeal to Middle Eastern governments. In December 2005, they travelled to Cairo armed with a dossier that included the cartoons.

The imam’s dossier — all 43 pages of it — was probably the most inflammatory part of the entire affair. It included not just the cartoons and translations of Jyllands-Posten’s editorials on Islam and self-censorship, but other material as well. There were abusive letters which the imams said had been sent to Muslims in Denmark. There were clippings from other papers, images completely unrelated to Denmark and Jyllands-Posten, unsubstantiated and inaccurate claims about the relationship between Denmark and its Muslim community, and a host of other material designed specifically to rile up Muslim readers. According to the secretly recorded statement of one of the Danish clerics, the dossier was intended to ‘create a climate of hate against the newspaper, God willing’.

In this, the dossier was a great success. The result of the fundamentally political decision to create a dossier that exaggerated and distorted the actions of Jyllands-Posten was devastating. Throughout February 2006 — more than four months after the publication of the cartoons — protests and riots erupted throughout the Muslim world. The targets of ire were not just symbols of Denmark but other countries whose newspapers either reprinted the cartoons or were generally presumed to be in league with the anti-Muslim sentiment contained within. The Danish embassy in Damascus was stormed. The European Union offices in Gaza were stormed. Riots occurred in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. In Nigeria, protestors attacked and burned down local Christian churches. Some estimates suggest that globally 200 people lost their lives in the aftermath of the cartoons’ publication.

In Denmark, Rose and the cartoonist Kurt Westergaard were the subject of numerous death threats and assassination plots. One particularly close call occurred when a Somali man invaded Westergaard’s home with an axe and a knife. Westergaard hid in a panic room until Danish police shot and wounded the man, who was linked to a radical Islamist group. Other plots disrupted include attempts to attack the offices of Jyllands-Posten — a disturbing foreshadowing of the devastating Charlie Hebdo attack earlier this year.

The Danish cartoons crisis has, in light of subsequent events, taken on a deeper meaning. But in 2005 the political undercurrents of clerical aniconism seemed to be at the forefront. The Danish imams were playing Danish politics when they compiled their dossier of grievances. One cleric had been particularly incensed with Jyllands-Posten for publishing details of a sermon he had given in which he described women as the devil’s work. He saw the cartoons as an opportunity for some payback.

Likewise, the governments of Saudi Arabia and Iran had their domestic audience in mind when they lodged their Danish protests. The violence emanated primarily from within Muslim countries and not from Muslim migrants in Denmark. Local riots always have local causes. Attacks on Christians in Muslim-majority countries were as much driven by local prejudices as anything else.

In some countries — such as India and Pakistan — extremists used the existence of the cartoons as a way to destabilise domestic regimes. Other protests were sponsored by the governments of Iran and Syria to underline their own regimes’ religious piety.

One notable aspect of the Danish crisis is the relationship between Jyllands-Posten’s decision to publish the cartoons and the blame laid by critics on the Danish government. How does a feature in an independent newspaper so quickly become a question of diplomacy between national governments? We are used to political leaders sharing their views on the non-political scandals of the hour, but the Danish imams and the eleven Muslim governments were after more than just a side-comment by Prime Minister Rasmussen. They wanted a legal and political response.

The principle of a free press not subject to direct controls by the government of the day is a liberal one. Yet this liberal idea is not internationally unanimous. The countries that protested so vigorously against the cartoons do not share the ethos of the free press. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Iran impose the death penalty for blasphemy. Turkey, Indonesia, Libya and Morocco also impose judicial punishment for blasphemy. Perhaps what the world saw in 2005 and 2006 was an international clash between two societies. The virtues of free expression were lost in translation.

And yet this explanation is too simple. Freedom of speech is hardly an overriding concern in the West either. One need only look at the repeated legal actions taken against Charlie Hebdo to see that. Or indeed, against Jyllands-Posten. Denmark has a blasphemy law which prohibits the public ridicule of a religious community. Denmark’s blasphemy law is a criminal law, rather than a civil one. The committee of imams complained to the police that such a violation had occurred, but the outcome of the police investigation was that the cartoon publication would be protected by exceptions covering matters of public interest.

What messages do such laws send? They suggest that religious insult is a matter for state supervision. Moreover, they imply that the bounds of public discourse should be determined by legislation, and that the proper response to offensive newspaper publications is to approach the police. No wonder the immediate appeal of the imams — and the foreign governments — was directed to the Danish government.

Hate speech and blasphemy laws undermine the liberal firewall that exists between individual expression and the views of society as a whole. Once we have established the principle that the nation can prevent offensive speech, it is unsurprising that people blame the nation for having failed to prevent offence. Rasmussen’s response to the diplomatic protest stated that: The freedom of expression has a wide scope and the Danish government has no means of influencing the press. However, Danish legislation prohibits acts or expressions of blasphemous or discriminatory nature. The offended party may bring such acts or expressions to court, and it is for the courts to decide in individual cases.

Pleading the fundamental right to freedom of expression simply looks false when blasphemy and hate speech laws are sitting on the statute books, waiting to be used. In the wake of the Charlie Hebdo massacre in January 2015, world leaders, foreign ministers, ambassadors and other dignitaries gathered in Paris to take a stand against Islamist violence. Linking arms they walked solemnly down a Parisian boulevard, looking as if they were leading the protest marches that had brought more than a million people onto the streets in Paris that day.

In fact, this was an illusion: the famed photo-op was conducted in an otherwise empty and secure side-street, far away from the crowds. More egregious, and more suggestive, was the fact that many of the leaders who attended the protest apparently in defence of freedom of expression were in charge of countries that aggressively stifled expression at home. Take, for instance, Sameh Shoukry, the foreign minister of Egypt, marching at the very time that Al Jazeera journalists, including the Australian Peter Greste, were locked up in a Cairo prison. So too was the Russian foreign minister — envoy to a country that targets journalists and whistle blowers for criticising the government.

Even Western, liberal leaders like David Cameron and Angela Merkel preside over laws that prohibit and punish hate speech. And Australia, of course, has section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act. After the Charlie Hebdo killings Tony Abbott argued rightly that ‘from time to time people will be upset, offended, insulted, humiliated … but it is all part of a free society.’ Yet our legal system does not reflect this basic liberal principle.

Speech laws, we have been told time and time again, play as much a symbolic role as a practical one; showing who we are as a nation, the language and sentiments we will not tolerate.

Rose’s Tyranny of Silence is especially good when it contextualises the cartoon crisis in the long historical contest over individual liberty and dissent. As a journalist, he spent a great deal of time talking to Soviet dissidents who wanted the same sort of liberal freedoms enjoyed in the West. Many Muslims now want the same freedoms but are prevented from expressing their desire by a stultifying public sphere in Islamic countries and the aggressive political dominance of radical Muslim ‘spokesmen’ in the West.

As Rose points out, Western liberalism’s weak and hesitating defence of free speech is not only a poor defence of its own values, but it abandons liberals in the Muslim world who are looking for alternative political paths. There are many human rights activists in the Muslim world crying out for the liberties which we now bargain away in the mistaken name of ‘toleration’.

Defending freedom of expression is not some academic preoccupation. It is fundamental to our idea of ourselves — to our liberties, and ultimately, to our civilisation.

The end of history in Australian universities

Every country has national myths and legends — vague memories of the past that add up to a sense of national identity. For Australia, think Gallipoli, the union strikes of the 1890s, the austerity of the Great Depression, and soon.

This populist historical awareness has practical consequences. How Australians understand, for instance, the causes and significance of the Great Depression has shaped how they understand the modern economy. There is a good case that Kevin Rudd and Wayne Swan were driven in 2008 by a fear of becoming James Scullin, the Depression-era Labor prime minister whose economic failings made his a one-term government.

Likewise, the place of Gallipoli in the national mindset is an ongoing contest that implicitly relates to our modern debates about foreign policy, our alliances, and military commitments.

History matters, not just for its own sake but for the way it reflects back to the present. We are constantly looking for our origins, in the hope they will somewhat hint at our future.

In July 2015, the IPA released a major report, The End of History … in Australian Universities. The goal was to understand how history is understood by looking at what academic historians pass on to the next generation. Few undergraduate history students go on to be academic historians, of course. But many become secondary school history teachers, and the rest constitute a cohort of formally trained historians, regardless of whether they practice the profession of history writing and research after graduation.

Underpinning this report was our creation of the first complete database of history subjects taught at the undergraduate level in Australian colleges and universities in 2014 — all 739 subjects, taught at 34 separate institutions. We categorised the subjects according to their geographic focus, the historical period they looked at, and their ‘theme’.

Indeed, this is something that the historical profession itself should be, and has been, interested in. Our research was based substantially on the work of a report last published in 2004 by the Australian Historical Association (AHA). The categories were largely theirs, and the notion of a traditional canon was likewise derived from the AHA. Thus we could make some useful comparisons not just about the state of undergraduate history today, but how it has changed.

Our most dramatic finding was that out of 739 undergraduate history subjects, there were just fifteen that specifically focused on British history. Those fifteen subjects were spread between just ten different institutions. In other words, there are 24 history faculties in Australia that do not offer any British history to undergraduates. This is quite striking. It is not an exaggeration to say that the institutions that make Australia what it is today were imported wholesale from Britain. We inherited our liberal democracy, our market economy, our emphasis on individual rights, the common law, and our public ethic of toleration from Britain.

What institutions we did not directly get from Britain we adopted from other British colonies — for instance, Australian federalism was modelled on the American and Canadian examples. Yet British history is in precipitous decline in Australian undergraduate history faculties.

So what has replaced it? For a long time undergraduate history subjects have tended towards specialisation. Rather than broad, ‘survey’ overviews of historical periods of nations and civilisations, even many first year subjects direct their focus to narrow, thematic topics. For instance, it is common to find the history of human rights, or environmental history, or genocide. To be certain, many survey subjects remain. But the era of systematic historical undergraduate knowledge is largely over. More universities teach popular culture than intellectual history. Film history is offered at more universities than British history.

Specialist subjects are necessary and valuable. Indigenous history is important. The history of gender and sexuality matters. The history of film is fascinating. But is it proportionately more important than Australia’s institutional history?

British history is worth dwelling on for no other reason than its role in the establishment of Australian institutions. Its absence says perhaps less about the interests of students and teachers at universities than about the way we understand the role of the history and our relationship to the past.

Some clue to this is found in the fact that history courses were overwhelmingly dominated by subjects on twentieth century history. Of 739 subjects, 308 focused on the twentieth century. Just 189 covered the later modern period, which we define as 1788 to 1900. Indeed, if we exclude ancient history subjects, which in many institutions are offered in separate courses, then there are more discernibly twentieth century subjects than the rest of the historical periods combined.

One of the most influential books in the study of history was published by the University of Cambridge historian Herbert Butterfield: The Whig Interpretation of History, published in 1931. Butterfield’s book — more of an essay — is often cited but rarely read. Butterfield criticised what he called ‘Whig history’, which, as it has come to be popularly understood, implicitly depicted history as a series of progressive advances giving us the world we are today.

The Whig Interpretation of History is stirring polemic but it sparked a small cottage industry of work which has been trying to determine the specific nature of this Whig history that Butterfield wished to avoid. For instance, the only ‘Whig’ historian he mentioned was the conservative Lord Acton.

In fact, Butterfield’s argument was much bolder. He is critical of all history that interprets the past in the light of the present. He is critical of abridgement and short-cuts in historical narrative — indeed, in Butterfield’s opinion the more history is condensed for the reader’s benefit, the more Whiggish it inevitably becomes.

It is hard to disagree with the claim that historical events should be understood in their own context, as they were understood at the time and, at least ideally, without importing anachronistic frames of reference from our own age. Yet Butterfield flirts with the notion of history as being almost entirely disconnected from contemporary concerns. The historian should look for discontinuities. The study of history is the practice of alienating oneself from the present, searching for distances, not closing gaps.

In many ways, as the historian Marshall Poe writes, Butterfield’s argument is a neat polemical summary of the almost always unstated philosophy that underpins modern historical practice: ‘It can easily be demonstrated that these traits — what we will call discontinuity, empiricism, and neutrality — are indeed not specific to Butterfield’s thought, but are in fact the most basic ontological, epistemic, and ethical standards of modern historical writing.’

By empiricism, Poe means the commitment to sources and evidence on which historians rest their judgment. Neutrality refers to research objectivity — in practice, an ethical ideal to strive for. Of the three, discontinuity has the most significance. The lesson here is that there are so many differences between our time and the past, that to compare the present to the past is to mislead. For instance, in our book Magna Carta: the Tax Revolt that Gave us Liberty, we describe the complex mixture of thirteenth century fees and charges and financial payments between vassals and lords and barons and kings, as taxes. It might be said, as indeed some historians have said, that such a description is anachronistic. To call these payments ‘taxes’ is to apply modern ideas about citizen-government fiscal relations in an era where they not apply. In thirteenth century England, the state did not levy taxes for public goods.

Yet acknowledging the conceptual distinctions between tax in our time and the network of levies and charges of eight hundred years ago does not preclude us from identifying relationships between our system and the past, and between medieval England and other medieval societies.

A more radical position which can be drawn out from Butterfield’s anti-Whig philosophy is a rejection of the notion of ‘origin’ stories in history. When discussing the Magna Carta, perhaps more consequential generalisation concerns the origins of parliament. One Chapter in the Magna Carta prohibited the king from imposing ‘scutages’ and ‘aids’ without the common counsel of the kingdom. Over time, this evolved into parliamentary control over taxation.

But in its specific, discontinuous context it does not. Is it right to say that this was the origin of parliament as we know it today? There were so many specific and diverse inputs into the evolution of parliament that perhaps to do so is an anachronistic and ahistorical confusion, imposing categorisations where none can apply.

Butterfield clearly did not hold fully to the philosophy expressed in his most famous book. One of his other books was titled The Origins of Modern Science. But the approach he counselled — to seek alienation to understand the past — has, it seems, left its mark.

While it is true that much university history teaching is about the acquisition of profession skills — assessment of evidence, scholarly writing and so forth — the bulk is about passing on knowledge of history. And while professional historical practice does require the historian to try to place themselves in a world different to their own, the task of teaching history is different from ‘doing’ history, just as expression is different to thought.

We do not make the world anew every generation. Our institutions, our ideas, our attitudes, our culture, are all historical, in that they are derived from the past, but are not of the past. If every past culture is alien — if the discontinuities of the past outshine all else — it might seem of no consequence whether British history is taught or not. But the historian lives in the present. History students live in the present. We are interested in history because of the present. Origins matter.

The anniversary of the First World War has sparked a broad cultural conversation in Australia about the meaning of Australia’s participation in that conflict, the Anzac legend, and the nature and symbolic representation of Gallipoli. That conversation is happening in public. When young people flock to the Dawn Service or travel to that famous Turkish peninsula, they are participating in a debate about the meaning of Australia’s past.

And when 49 per cent of Australians between 18 and 29, when asked by the 2015 Lowy Institute poll, cannot agree that democracy is preferable to any other form of government, they are implicitly engaged in a dialogue with Australia’s liberal democratic past, where those liberal democratic institutions came from, and the value we put on them.

There are reasons to be optimistic. The popularity of history in our bookshops, the engagement with the Anzac tradition, and the increasing localised historical awareness (symbolised by the explosion in family histories) shows an Australian public desperate to understand their roots. The history profession is keenly aware of this popular demand. Yet that demand is about origins, not discontinuities.

As Edmund Burke wrote, ‘People will not look forward to posterity who never look backward to their ancestors.’ But then again Burke was, as A.J.P. Taylor put it, a corrupt ‘Whig hack’.