Malcolm Turnbull’s Super Ministry

The new Home Affairs Ministry will be an administrative behemoth. It is unlikely that it will bring any great national security dividends. It is very likely that it will have undesirable consequences for Australia’s immigration program.

The Home Affairs Ministry takes the federal police, ASIO, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, and the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission away from the Attorney-General. It takes the Office of Transport Security away from the Infrastructure Minister. It gives them all to the Immigration Minister Peter Dutton, who already has his own quasi-security agency, the Australian Border Force.

The politics here are obvious. Dutton is a senior conservative in a government that conspicuously lacks senior conservatives. But as a policy matter, there’s little public evidence to suggest that we our federal agencies are struggling to coordinate on security matters – although the 2014 Sydney siege did reveal weaknesses in federal-state security coordination, which the government has rightly moved to repair.

Where agencies sit on the ministerial map can have significant policy consequences. The creation of the Home Affairs Ministry locks in this government’s recasting of immigration as an economic opportunity to immigration as a security threat – a threat to national security, biosecurity, even economic security. Malcolm Turnbull has begun to use Julia Gillard’s old formulation: “Australian jobs are for Australians”.

Immigration and security are only a good fit if you squint very hard. For the most part Dutton’s day job has been the mundane work of supervising and approving or denying marginal visa applicants. The immigration minister is vested more discretionary powers than anyone else in the cabinet. Now that his focus is on security – taking constant briefings from ASIO and the AFP about domestic threats – security is how Australia’s immigration program will now be framed.

Medicare details available on dark web is just tip of data breach iceberg

Modern governments use a lot of data. A lot. Our social services are organised by massive databases. Health, welfare, education and the pension all require reams of information about identity, social needs, eligibility, and entitlement.

Our infrastructure is managed by massive databases holding information about traffic flows, public transport usage, communications networks, and population flows.

Our security is maintained by complex information systems managing defence assets, intelligence data, and capabilities and deployment information.

We should be thinking about these enormous data holdings when we read the news that thieves have been selling Medicare numbers linked to identities on the “dark web” – a mostly untraceable anonymous corner of the internet.

That last detail is what has made this such a scandal for the government, as Human Services Minister Alan Tudge and the Australian Federal Police have scrambled to identity the systems’ weaknesses.

But the fact that the Medicare numbers are being sold is the only thing that makes this an unusual data security breach. Australian government databases are constantly being accessed by people who are not authorised to do so.

Here’s just a taste. Last year the Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission revealed it had laid 81 criminal charges and 11 disciplinary recommendations in the space of 12 months for unauthorised access to confidential information by police. One of those was a police officer who had been trawling through crime databases looking for information about people he had met on a dating service. He was convicted of 50 charges of unauthorised access.

A Queensland police officer was disciplined in May this year for using the police database to share the address of a woman with her husband who was subject to a restraining order.

The Victorian government’s police database was wrongly accessed 214 times between 2008 and 2013, by “hundreds” of officers.

Earlier this year 12 staff were fired from the Australian Taxation Office for accessing tax data on celebrities and people they knew.

We could go on. These of course are the instances we know about because they have been detected and reported on. There are undoubtedly others.

Governments manage a lot of data because we ask them to do it a lot, and to do what they do well.

They run thousands of complex systems. Many of these systems have been jerry-rigged and adapted from earlier systems, a series of politicised, over-budget and under-delivering IT projects stacked on top of each other over decades.

But these repeated episodes of unauthorised access show that these complex systems are in dire need of reform.

It is clear that the “permission” structures on these government databases are deeply broken.

In the debate over mandatory data retention one of the big questions was whether law enforcement and regulatory agencies should have to obtain a warrant before accessing stored data. In the end the government decided no warrant was necessary – because warrants could only slow down investigations.

This is exactly the sort of loose permission structure that leads to abuse. Just two weeks after data retention officially came into effect this April, the Australian Federal Police admitted one of its members had illegally accessed the metadata of a journalist.

This breach was entirely predictable. Data retention opponents repeatedly predicted it.

Last week’s Medicare breach has been made possible because thousands and thousands of people – bureaucrats, health professionals, and so on – can access the Medicare database. Most police officers, bureaucrats, and health professionals are trustworthy. But it only takes a few bad actors to wreck a system built on trust.

Rather than leaving data access up to the discretion of thousands of people, we need stricter codified rules on data access. Government databases need to be restructured to prevent, not simply penalise, government employees from going on fishing expeditions through our data.

The point isn’t to provide a legal or technological fix to the problem of unauthorised access. Rather, we should completely reimagine who owns the information that the government keeps on all of us. We ought to own and control our information, not the state.

New cryptographic technologies increasingly being applied to blockchain and cryptocurrency applications allow for even greater personal control over information. If applied, they would only allow government agents to know exactly what they need to know.

And it would move us from a system of surveillance and big data, to one of personal disclosure and privacy.

In the past, economic reform was targeted at big sectors like banking, telecommunications, and trade.

As Australian governments evolve inevitably into complex information brokers, the next wave of reform will have to focus on data management.

Delegation and Unbundling in a Crypto-Democracy

Abstract: Representative democracy consists of a chain of delegation from voters to the executive and a corresponding chain of accountability, with some questions (particularly constitutional questions) reserved for popular vote. This structure reflects the high transaction costs of coordinating preferences among a large and diverse population, which has in part been determined by technological limitations. A new technology, blockchain, significantly reduces transaction costs. This technology turns out to have significant implications for democratic governance. In a crypto-democracy, voters have contractual relationships that allow them to unbundle, delegate, re-rebundle and reserve their voting power. Rather than planning our democratic structure and thus restricting opportunities for political exchange, the use of blockchain in a crypto-democracy allows us to ‘grow’ a democracy in a Hayekian framework.

Working paper available at SSRN.

The South Australian Major Bank Levy: Arbitrary, unjustified, and harmful for South Australia and the rest of the country

With Sinclair Davidson

Introduction: In the South Australian state budget 2017-18, South Australian Treasurer Tom Koutsantonis announced that the state government intended to introduce a South Australian Major Bank Levy, one of two revenue measures “to help us meet the cost of our significant support for driving economic growth and creating more jobs”. Treasurer Koutsantonis made clear that this levy was explicitly modelled on the Commonwealth government’s Major Bank Levy, which was announced in the May 2017-18 Commonwealth budget and passed the Commonwealth parliament in June.

Banking is a key sector in a modern economy. Banks and the financial markets they serve work to allocate capital across the economy to its most efficient purpose. The health of the banking sector is closely related to the health of the economy in general; likewise, an unstable and inefficient banking sector often causes, or is at least a leading indicator of, turmoil in the general economy. The centrality of banking and financial markets to economic prosperity and recession throughout history is reason to subject public policy proposals that affect banking markets to particular scrutiny.

This paper is an examination of the South Australian Major Bank Levy. The South Australian Major Bank Levy is intended to exactly replicate the Commonwealth Government’s Major Bank Levy but at the state level. Accordingly, it applies an additional 0.015% tax on South Australia’s share of the total value of bank liabilities that are subject to the Commonwealth Major Bank Levy Act 2017. That levy consists of a tax introduced on a range of liabilities held by the five of Australia’s largest banks – the Commonwealth Bank, the ANZ, the National Australia Bank, Westpac and Macquarie Bank. While these banks are not explicitly named in legislation, they are subject to the levy because they each have total liabilities greater than $100 billion – raising the prospect of new banks being added or of existing banks dropping off the list.

Both levies apply to the total liabilities held by each bank with the exception of that bank’s additional Tier 1 capital, its deposits protected by the Financial Claims Scheme (that is, its government guaranteed deposits), an amount equal to the lesser of the derivative asserts and derivative liabilities of each bank, and its exchange settlement account held with the Reserve Bank of Australia.

This paper finds that the South Australian Major Bank Levy:

  • will be economically harmful to a state that has seen a rise in unemployment and a decline in business investment,
  • lacks serious justification in either taxation or banking policy,
  • represents a rollback of the GST compact of 2000 which required South Australia to remove state taxes on banking and financial services,
  • harms the stability of banking in South Australia and Australia more generally,
  • increases ‘regime uncertainty’ for investors, and
  • there are reasons to believe it has already done harm to the South Australian economy.

Not only should the bank levy be rejected by the South Australian parliament, but parliament needs to work to ensure that markets and investors have certainty that such an arbitrary and harmful intervention could not occur in South Australia in the future.

Available in PDF here.

State Government bank levy makes South Australia riskiest place for investment in Australia

Imagine being an international investor looking at Treasurer Tom Koutsantonis’s Budget. You wouldn’t be interested in his infrastructure spend and “future jobs fund”.

You’d immediately hone in on the fact that the South Australian government has doubled down on the Federal Coalition’s bank levy by introducing its own state bank levy.

And you’d immediately understand that this makes SA the riskiest state to invest in, in a country that is looking like an increasingly risky place to invest.

South Australia has the highest unemployment rate in the nation. It needs firms to put their money into the state and create productive private sector jobs. No government spending can substitute for an attractive economic investment climate.

In this, the state’s bank levy is almost comically bad. The federal bank levy is arbitrary, punitive and unjustifiable. Treasurer Scott Morrison groped around for a rationale for taxing the big banks, finally landing on: people “don’t like you”.

Koutsantonis’s tax is even more arbitrary and its rationale even more slight. In his Budget speech, he said that the “banking sector is very profitable” and that given, in his view, the GST should be applied to financial services, SA should expropriate some of the big banks’ money.

But this is nothing more than a rhetorical shell game. The SA bank levy looks nothing like the GST, developed and refined over nearly two decades to be as efficient as possible. The GST is a consumption tax specifically designed to be paid by consumers.

Koutsantonis says he will ban the banks from passing his tax onto consumers. (This is astonishing by itself – the SA government is going to start regulating banks? We ended state-based financial services regulation 20 years ago.)

Finally, the GST was specifically devised in order to get rid of state-based taxes on financial products. These taxes – the bank account debits (BAD) tax and financial institutions duty (FID) – were uniformly agreed to be inefficient, to disproportionately harm the poor, and to harm Australia’s international competitiveness.

Getting rid of the FID and BAD tax was a key part of the GST deal. Is SA going back on that deal? Is it dipping out of the GST compact? How do Koutsantonis and Premier Jay Weatherill think the other states and Commonwealth, should respond?

With the imminent closure of Holden, SA needs to be looking to grow its economy and attract investors. But if there’s one thing investors hate, it is policy uncertainty.

Policy uncertainty is exactly what Koutsantonis has delivered.

The end of liberalism?

Nothing in the language of the 2017 Commonwealth budget was exceptional by Australian standards. Treasurer Scott Morrison stood in parliament and announced what he described as a ‘fair and responsible path back to a balanced budget’, followed by an optimistic account of global macroeconomic conditions, a happy assurance that surpluses would be achieved in years to come, a brief panegyric of the virtues of small business, followed by a list of infrastructure projects to be built near marginal electorates.

Nonetheless, the 2017 budget is likely to be seen as one of the most significant in Australian history. In a very real way, the budget bills that Morrison announced can be said to cap not the era of economic reform (Australian governments have long given up serious market driven reform and privatisation), but an era where at least one side of politics was offering any ideological or intellectual support for free market policies.

There have been disappointing budgets before, of course, and disappointing budgets from Liberal governments. But there are two features of the 2017 budget that make it significantly different from the disappointments that have gone before: the bank tax and the increase in the Medicare levy to fund the National Disability Insurance Scheme. The first is a punitive, distortionary, arbitrary, and incoherent fiscal attack on an unpopular but absolutely vital economic sector. The second is a broad based tax increase to finance a new social service that seems more like Whitlam-era public policy.

The bank tax is most striking because it is almost entirely disconnected from any explicit policy rationale. The complete argument for the bank tax Morrison presented on budget night was this: it ‘represents an additional and fair contribution from our major banks, is similar to measures imposed in other advanced countries, and will even up the playing field for smaller banks.’ In other words, it is ‘fair’, other countries have done it, and it will cut the big banks down to size.

Since budget night advocates of the tax have been trying to retrofit justifications to the proposal: arguing that it is a payment for deposit insurance or the government’s implicit too-big-to-fail protection. But the new bank tax does not even pretend to be pegged to the value of any implicit government guarantee. The government just wants money, and banks are where money is.

Of course, governments have always looked to the banks for money. Arbitrary, punitive taxation is hardly unprecedented. But we are not living in just any historical moment, in any country. Australia is one of the richest, freest and most open countries in the world, the beneficiary of three decades of economic reform — reform that sought to reduce the number of arbitrary, punitive and counterproductive taxes and regulations on the industries central to our wealth.

The budget in the sweep of Australian history

The era of economic reform is typically said to have begun in 1983 and ended in 1993 or 2000. It kicked off with Paul Keating’s floating of the dollar, from which so many other reforms had to flow. It ended either with the Fightback! election loss, or the introduction of the GST by the Howard government.

But of course no policy reform movement comes from nothing and disappears immediately without leaving a shadow. Political interest in market reform survived the reforms themselves. The Abbott government’s 2014 Commission of Audit remains an impressively radical and ambitious document.

Likewise, the ideas of market reform significantly predate the Hawke government. The floating of the dollar and the subsequent liberalisation of banking would not have been possible had the Fraser government not commissioned the Campbell inquiry into the Australian financial system in 1978, and directed it to develop recommendations consistent with ‘the Government’s free enterprise objectives’. And those objectives did not come from nowhere. Malcolm Fraser himself might have been a reluctant free marketeer but the Fraser government was starting to feel the ideological heat from the Dries within its ranks. The sense of a sharp division between the reform period and the 2017 budget is in part because Morrison and Malcolm Turnbull have chosen totarget, of all sectors, banks — the high ground of market reform for half a century.

Yet by the time of the Campbell committee, economic liberalisation had been a pitched battle in Australian politics for more than a decade. The truly pivotal ideological moment was the appointment of Alf Rattigan as chair of the Tariff Board in 1963. Rattigan, who had been assumed at that time to be a quiet, unassuming and pragmatic bureaucrat, waged a long running war against Australia’s high tariff regime from his Tariff Board post. Working with sympathetic and economic literate journalists like Maxwell Newton, Max Walsh, Alan Wood, P. P. McGuiness, Tony Thomas and Ken Davidson, as well as parliamentarians like the legendary maverick Bert Kelly, Rattigan made tariffs and trade a central political issue, redefining the terms of Australian policy debate, and, over time, creating the divide between those who wanted to reduce the government’s reach over the economy and those who wanted to maintain the status quo.

It is often forgotten how this division shaped the bitterly personal contests between John McEwen, John Gorton and William McMahon. This convoluted battle was focused as much on Australia’s tariff regime as anything else. In the 1966 election, a group of woolgrowers and graziers created the free trade lobby, the Basic Industries Group. Although it wished not to harm the Coalition and campaigned only in a few safe seats, it nearly tore the Coalition apart, creating a divide between Liberal free traders like McMahon and the protectionist McEwen. Maxwell Newton, who had been editor of The Australian Financial Review and founding editor of The Australian, used the small trade newsletters he ran in the late 1960s to conduct what the journalist Alan Reid described as a ‘free wheeling political vendetta’ against McEwen on the issue of the tariff.

The tariff contest burbled away in the background of the Liberal Party and the conservative movement more generally during the Whitlam years. Milton Friedman came to Australia in 1975, and Friedrich Hayek visited the year after that. By the time the Society of Modest Members — the group of current and former state and federal MPs dedicated to market reform — had its first meeting in 1981, the free market insurgency had been long established. The ideas on which the Modest Members pinned their hopes had been the source of bitter division in the Coalition for a decade and a half.

The origin of the victory of market economics over technocratic social democracy dates further than even the most senior of our press gallery journalists. Yet with Morrison’s budget, that victory seems to have expired.

Is market liberalism exhausted?

Market liberalism has gone through cycles of decline and resurgence before. Historical perspective helps because it is easy in the current political environment to personalise what is happening: to blame Tony Abbott or Malcolm Turnbull, or any other constellation of political leadership. It is certainly the case that Australia has been poorly served for the last decade. But the leadership comes from the political class itself; they provide the pool from which the leader is chosen and they have the votes. Every prime minister, even the most disappointing, had, at one stage, the endorsement of majority in their party room.

The Liberal Party has been severed from its base — the core voters which support it, raise money for it, man booths for it, and generally give it social force — and has not been rewarded with national popularity.

The Liberal government has tried to echo the Labor Party on notions of ‘fairness’, but why would you buy Liberal fairness when you can buy Labor’s real thing? If trying to reduce inequality by taxing the rich is desirable, why vote Coalition? If the banks need to be punished, why not support the parties that really believe it?

Opponents of reform to section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act have repeatedly argued that the fight for freedom of speech is a ‘distraction’, and that the Coalition government should be allowed to concentrate on economic reform. But now it seems that the government has given up on both free speech and lower taxes — civil liberties and market economics go hand in hand, and the government seems uninterested in both.

The decline of the Liberal Party, and to a lesser extent the Liberal-National Coalition, into a shadow of its opponents is a sign of exhaustion in the centre-right political class. It also reflects a failure to revitalise free market ideas — and liberalism more generally — decades after the age of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan.

The window for ‘reasonable’ policy ideas in Australia is remarkably narrow and parochial. No government wants to be caught stepping even slightly outside the thin band of mainstream policy ideas. Canadian income tax rates are indexed to inflation, eliminating the problem of inflation-induced bracket creep. Yet it would be seen as radical and unrealistic in Australia to propose anything of the sort, even though tax rate indexation has successfully worked overseas and was trialled in Australia under the Fraser government.

The unwillingness to puncture some of these sureties, to develop, legitimate and push through policy in the face of opposition, and to seriously challenge the status quo has left Australia’s policy regime stagnant and fragile. Market liberalism arose in just this sort of historical moment, when the Keynesian policies of the mid-century exhausted themselves, unable to provide answers to the economic decline throughout the developed world. Is market liberalism now exhausted too? Certainly parties that profess market liberalism seem to be tired of pursuing free market policies.

The Coalition’s push to the left on economics has been paralleled in other developed countries. Theresa May’s 2017 manifesto declared that conservativism ‘is not and never has been the philosophy described by caricaturists’:

We do not believe in untrammelled free markets. We reject the cult of selfish individualism. We abhor social division, injustice, unfairness and inequality. We see rigid dogma and ideology not just as needless but dangerous.

But far from rejecting the caricature, this seems to reinforce it. Who, after all, believes in ‘untrammelled free markets’? Even the most vigorous anarcho-capitalist believes that markets are ‘trammelled’ by the constraints of norms, values and human-made institutions. If there is a cult of selfish individualism, does it have any members? May claims to be distancing the Conservatives from some sort of spartan Thatcherism but the frivolous nature of this attempt only underpins the impression that ‘May-ism’ is just unmoored from any philosophical foundation.

Against this, the appeal of a Jeremy Corbyn — whose public persona is inseparable from his deeply held political views — is obvious.

Market liberalism looks slightly better across the Atlantic but even in the United States it is in a bad way. The Trump administration’s red tape reduction program, ambitious tax reform, and budget proposals look exciting — if they can be accomplished. Withdrawing from the Paris Agreement is deeply symbolic, but needs to be married with specific policies that roll back the renewable energy labyrinth put in place by the Obama administration.

Otherwise, Donald Trump’s explicitly anti-trade position undercuts one of the founding principles of market liberalism.

Seen in this context, the exhaustion of liberalism in Australia is hardly surprising — it’s exhausted everywhere.

Rebuilding liberalism

Yet we should not look to high politics for a guide to the vibrancy and potential of a set of ideas as rich as the philosophy of liberty. In 1929 a group of Australian economists wrote that in Australia:

practically all shades of thought are committed to some form of Government activity in the economic sphere, whether it be wage regulation or assistance to immigration, criticism of the policy of laissez faire is unnecessary.

The Institute of Public Affairs was founded fourteen years later, and half a century later the idea that we needed to introduce competition and markets into our stagnant economy was a bipartisan view. Long before this year’s budget it has been obvious that our politicians had declared free market ideas as empty platitudes; a period of time in the wilderness will allow for the intellectual rebuilding of centre-right politics.

In fact, the times suit the ideas of free markets and individual liberty more than our political parties realise or acknowledge. The IPA has spelt out at length the tax and red tape challenges holding back the Australian economy — nothing the Labor Party or the newly centrist Coalition are currently proposing have a hope of tackling those two fundamental economic problems.

If the retreat of market liberalism globally has the effect it had in earlier times — greater macroeconomic instability and uncertainty — Australia will need a resilient and adaptable economy to suit.

Other trends demand a revitalised liberalism: the spread of automation from the industrial sector to the high-end service sector, the increasing demand for personal control over healthcare, the move of global economic power from the West to Asia.

Malcolm Turnbull failed to turn his 2016 innovation agenda into anything more than slogans, but like it or not, this is where the big changes are going to come. Doubling down on the twentieth century welfare and planning economic model is not going to help the losers from those changes, nor will it ensure the benefits are distributed widely.

The task now is an intellectual one — to build a new liberalism, a neo-neoliberalism, out of the failures of centre-right politics.

Submission to the Senate Select Committee on the Future of Public Interest Journalism

Introduction: It is widely agreed that a free and independent press is an essential part of a democratic order. This submission addresses itself to the implications of the words free and independent. Government intervention in the market for journalism risks undermining the reason we value publicly interested journalism in the first place – its role in providing a check on government and as a third-party watchdog on possible abuses of political, regulatory and fiscal power. When it comes to the profession of journalism and the industrial structure of the media, government is not a disinterested player. Even granting this parliament’s best intentions, government intervention in the media opens up the risk of government interference with the media from future parliaments.

Available in PDF here.

Opening statement to Senate Standing Committee on Economics Inquiry into the Treasury Laws Amendment (GST Low Value Goods) Bill 2017

With Sinclair Davidson

We recommend that the Treasury Laws Amendment (GST Low Value Goods) Bill be rejected by the parliament. It is our view that this is not an integrity measure, that this is not the government closing a loophole in the GST legislation as they claim, but rather that this is a new tax. This new tax does not promote fairness for Australian retailers or consumers. It deviates quite substantially from the current GST design and is only superficially similar to the GST in that it has a 10 per cent rate. The GST itself is a tax which purports to tax Australian consumption, but it is actually a sales tax, and the legal incidence of this tax is on the seller of the goods, and the economic incidence is the assumption that the tax is then passed on to final consumers.

This particular tax, however, does not vest legal incidence in the seller of the goods; it vests legal incidence in the electronic distribution platform and/or the people offering transportation services. It is those companies and entities which facilitate a transaction between foreigners and Australians who will bear the tax, not the seller and not the consumer. This is not a tax on Australian consumption at all, but rather it is a tax on trading with Australians.

As an aside, I noticed before that you were concerned about double taxation. If this tax is collected by the foreign seller or the electronic distribution platform, they may have a problem convincing their own tax authorities that this is not revenue to them, and they may in fact then be taxed on that in their home country. So they need to be able to tell a story that remitting money to the Australian government is actually a legitimate business expense, and I suspect we will find that it is not. So double taxation will come in, in that these foreigners in fact will be taxed in their home countries on a 10 per cent increase in revenue. I was also astonished to discover that the authorities—certainly the tax office—seem to be recklessly indifferent to consumer fraud. That is certainly a massive problem.

The unintended consequences of this tax are such that I think the government has not much thought about these consequences at all. It is very likely to reduce competition in the domestic market as foreign sellers withdraw their services and stop selling. It is likely to expose Australians to darker elements of the internet, reducing antifraud protections and consumer protections that they currently enjoy. It draws foreign entities into the Australian tax net, which currently are exempt from the Australian tax net. No thought has been given at all to the consequences of Australian businesses then being drawn into foreign governments’ tax nets. So not only will there be a greater compliance on foreigners imposed by the Australian government; foreign governments will in turn put a compliance burden on Australian businesses hoping to trade with their citizens. That has not been discussed at all. So the net compliance effect of this is unknown, certainly much more than the budgeted amount of $13 million, which I think is just the salaries of the people who will be working on this. The increased compliance cost on small business is likely to create a barrier to growth. Obviously, large Australian businesses are in a position to wear those fixed costs of foreign compliance. This will create a barrier to small business growth in Australia and again will be a barrier to entry.

This fails as a protection mechanism. Australian consumers pay well above 10 per cent price differentials when buying from domestic retailers than with foreign goods anyway. It fails to produce substantial revenue for the Australian government. We estimate it is less than 0.2 per cent of additional revenue on the existing GST. It is not clear to us that these inherent flaws can ever be repaired. If the government were to simply abolish the $1,000 threshold at the moment, they would find themselves in the position of having to borrow money to collect revenue at a loss, which of course is a completely nonsensical position.

We think the government should leave well enough alone, not introduce a new tax, not expose Australians to the dangers of the dark internet and substandard or unsafe goods, and not encourage Australians to move away from reputable online sellers. So this has no redeeming features whatsoever and it should not be legislated into existence. Thank you.

GST change is a plain and simple tariff, Scott Morrison

With Sinclair Davidson

The Turnbull government’s proposal to eliminate the $1000 threshold before the GST is levied on imported goods is not a tax integrity measure. It is a tariff, and one that will have serious repercussions that the government does not seem to have considered seriously.

The end of the low-value threshold was first flagged by the government in December 2014. It formed part of last year’s budget. Now there is actual separate legislation before parliament, and a Senate committee inquiry that will give its verdict on the legislation the same day Scott Morrison releases his 2017 budget.

By July, if everything goes to the government’s plan, the commonwealth will be receiving a stream of GST revenue from every global internet retailer that supplies Australian customers with a total of more than $75,000 worth of goods.

That’s the plan, anyway. This proposal is no more convincing now than it was two years ago when it was first announced.

In 2011 the Productivity Commission concluded that inspecting low-value imports at the border to assess their GST liability would cost more money than it would raise. So rather than getting Customs to collect the GST, the government wants to convince foreign online retailers to do it for them.

Let’s imagine this ploy works. Some of the consequences are easily predictable. First, many Australians will substitute away from well-known online sellers — such as eBay and Amazon — that have built excellent reputations for facilitating and protecting trade, to those less well-known sellers that are likely not to charge the GST.

Doing so will expose more Australians to online fraud and lead to them purchasing less reliable products from unreliable suppliers that may not meet our high quality and safety standards. It also will expose more Australians to the more unsavoury sellers on the internet, possibly leading to an increase in unlawful imports into the country.

At the very least, a 10 per cent increase in the cost of digital goods will make intellectual property ­piracy just that little bit more ­attractive. This is a real cost of the policy that must be fully accounted for.

Second, the way the government proposes to implement this measure constitutes an exercise in extraterritorial power. The commonwealth Treasury does not have jurisdiction over eBay (headquartered in San Jose, California) or Amazon (headquartered in Seattle). Attempting to rope them into our tax system will place the Australian government in conflict with our major trading partners. At the very least this should generate trade disputes at the World Trade Organisation.

Doubly so if our trading partners read the Treasurer’s second reading speech introducing the legislation, which makes it clear that this is a protectionist measure to benefit the Australian small businesses that have been “unfairly disadvantaged” by the fact they pay taxes that firms in other countries do not.

This is the nub of the issue. Transactions that occur in foreign countries should not be liable to the Australian GST.

The GST is usually described as being a “consumption tax” but in fact, for practical reasons, it is a tax on sales.

When Australian consumers purchase goods online from, say, a company based in Britain, the sale does not occur in Australia — it occurs in Britain.

The money is exchanged in Britain, the order is produced in Britain, the sale is processed in the Britain and the dispatch order is made from Britain.

The fact the goods are subsequently imported into Australia does not mean those goods should be liable to an Australian sales tax. A tax levied on imports is a tariff. This legislation is an embarrassing reversal of Australia’s longstanding free trade agenda.

Morrison pointed out in his second reading speech that his legislation is a “significant world first”. That is not something of which he should be proud.

In the realm of tax administration, at least, Australia is showing itself to be a bad international player.

Rather than introducing a new tariff to protect Australian business from international competi­tion, the government should focus its efforts on those features of the Australian business environment that impose such high prices on local consumers.

Working to lower company tax, high wage structures and reducing red tape would benefit Australians far more than protectionist measures for their small-business constituency.

Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Economics Inquiry into the Treasury Laws Amendment (GST Low Value Goods) Bill 2017

With Sinclair Davidson

Executive Summary: The elimination of the low-value threshold for the Goods and Services Tax constitutes a new tax on inbound internet trade – that is, it will function as a tariff imposed on Australian consumers.

  • The tax will raise very little revenue and will be expensive and complex to administer.
  • The tax deviates substantially from the existing GST design.
  • The tax is less a tax on consumption but on the reputation of foreign internet businesses.
  • The tax is inconsistent with the government’s commitment to deregulation, the promotion of international trade, and its innovation agenda.
  • The tax rejects principles that the Howard government established in terms of deregulation and the promotion of international trade.
  • The tax will do nothing to address the issue of high retail prices in Australia.
  • While masqueraded as a tax integrity measure, this tax is clearly intended to operate as a form of protectionism.
  • The tax will reduce competitive pressure within the domestic Australian economy, and (as a consequence) expose Australian consumers to government sanctioned higher retail prices.
  • The tax will lead to Australian consumers substituting away from large reputable electronic distribution platforms to more disreputable platforms leading to higher rates of internet fraud and possibility criminality. Product safety and consumer protection rights are likely to be compromised.
  • The tax has few safeguards to ensure compliance and remittance of revenue to the Australian government.
  • The tax contributes to increased levels of regime uncertainty within the Australian policy environment.

Parliament should reject the Treasury Laws Amendment (GST Low Value Goods) Bill 2017.

Available in PDF here.