Abstract: The paper provides a theory of freedom of speech based on the new institutional political economy. Through politics individuals seek to achieve collectively what they would not be able to achieve individually, forming institutions of social control. But institutions have costs which need to be discovered. Freedom of speech facilitates information discovery about the subjective costs of social institutions. Those costs are not only discovered but created through the acts of speech and expression. The paper develops this institutional approach by contrasting and complimenting against the three dominant theories of free speech: Mill’s marketplace of ideas theory, Meiklejohn’s democracy theory, and Baker’s liberty theory. The paper then shows how the institutional theory can be meaningfully applied to two common questions in freedom of speech debates: that of protest on publicly accessible property, and the relationship between freedom of speech and political correctness.
With Sinclair Davidson
Abstract: In this paper we provide a critique of the Finkelstein and Tiffen argument for increased regulation of the press. By failing to incorporate recent advances in the economics of regulation into their argument they fail to provide a coherent and rigorous foundation for their position. This leads them to overlook more obvious policy solutions to the problems they perceive in regulating the press. The Finkelstein and Tiffen paper also neglects to incorporate the political context underlying press regulation in general, and the Finkelstein Inquiry in particular. By underplaying the importance of both the economics of regulation and the politics of press regulation the Finkelstein and Tiffen paper misdiagnoses the problem under consideration and leads to inappropriate policy advice.