DAOs are adaptive governance engines

With Darcy WE Allen, Aaron M Lane, and Jason Potts. Available at SSRN.

Abstract: We develop a new theory of Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAOs) that explains why they exist in terms of what they do. In New Institutional Economics, firms exist because they minimise the transaction costs of using a market. DAOs, which are a species of firm but made of smart contracts, would prima facie seem to extend this logic to further economise on lower transaction costs. Our argument here is that this is almost correct, but misses a critical factor that becomes readily apparent when you actually observe how DAOs behave in the wild, which we do by studying three DAOs-Shapeshift, Uniswap, and Optimism. Our theory is that the value of a DAO largely accrues to the dynamic adaptation in governance that the institutional form affords. DAOs enable low cost and fast change in governance structures in order to adapt to dynamic regulatory, competitive, and financial environments. A DAO is therefore not just a type of automation to distribute and minimise agency costs through token-governed smart contracts, as simple transaction cost theory explains. Rather, a DAO is a mechanism for cheap and fast variation in governance to enable an organisation to adapt to a complex dynamic economic environment. When the benefits of this mechanism exceed the costs we predict the existence of a DAO.

Trade integration through digital infrastructure

Submission to House of Representatives Inquiry into Australian Agriculture in Southeast Asian Markets, with Darcy WE Allen and Aaron M Lane

The core of our submission is to emphasise the importance of digital economic infrastructure (e.g. identity systems, payments, traceability) for trade and economic development. This digital infrastructure can not only lower costs to facilitate more trade, but also is a critical mechanism by which Australian agriculture can continue to develop a trusted premium market positioning in the region.

View the full submission in PDF here.

Towards legal recognition of Decentralised Autonomous Organisations

With Darcy WE Allen and Aaron M Lane. Published in Australian Business Law Review, June 2024. Working paper available at SSRN.

Abstract: Decentralised Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) are a typical organisation form in the Web3 economy. DAOs are internet-native organisations that are coordinated and governed by pseudonymous community members through a nexus of blockchain-based digital assets and smart contracts. There is over US$26 billion locked in over 2,300 active DAOs globally. This article examines the legal recognition of DAOs in an Australian context. A recent Australian Senate Inquiry recommended DAOs be recognised as a distinct business structure. This article makes three contributions towards this goal: (1) critically evaluate options for DAO recognition under Australian law; (2) a comparative analysis of United States DAO laws; and (3) an analytical outline of the key design features of an Australian DAO law.

Managing Generative AI in Firms: The Theory of Shadow User Innovation

With Julian Waters-Lynch, Darcy WE Allen, and Jason Potts. Available at SSRN.

Abstract: This paper explores the management challenge posed by pervasive and unsupervised use of generative AI (GenAI) applications in firms. Employees are covertly experimenting with these tools to discover and capture value from their use, without the express direction or visibility of organisational leaders or managers. We call this phenomenon shadow user innovation. Our analysis integrates literature on user innovation, general purpose technologies and the evolution of firm capabilities. We define shadow user innovation as employee-led user innovation inside firms that is opaque to management. We explain how this opacity obstructs a firm’s ability to translate the use of GenAI into visible improvements in productivity and profitability, because employees can currently privately capture these benefits. We discuss potential management responses to this challenge, outline a research program, and offer practical guidance for managers.

The Governance of Cosmos Interchain Security

With Darcy WE Allen and Sinclair Davidson. Available at SSRN.

Abstract: Interchain security (ICS) allows the Cosmos Hub to provide security to other blockchains (‘consumer chains’) and represents a significant revenue model for the Cosmos Hub. This paper investigates the economic and governance aspects of these ICS agreements with a focus on ensuring that the agreements are value adding and robust. The paper identifies potential risks such as vertical integration, challenges in adapting to incomplete contracts, and opportunism in asset-specific investments. It proposes recommendations to enhance the sustainability of ICS relationships, including the establishment of individual governance bodies for each ICS agreement, strategies to manage foreign exchange risks, and a decision tree for the Cosmos Hub to assess new consumer chains. A draft template for consumer chain onboarding is also presented, detailing essential elements like governance, payment terms, and exit clauses. This paper aims to offer actionable insights for improving the governance structures in ICS agreements, thereby fostering robust and enduring interchain security dynamics.

Allocating Capital in Decentralised Networks: Mechanisms for the Cosmos Hub

With Darcy WE Allen and Sinclair Davidson. Available at SSRN.

Abstract: This paper helps allocate shared capital effectively in the Cosmos ecosystem by examining a range of different allocation mechanisms. We identify the core challenges of allocating shared capital – with a focus on knowledge, opportunism and coordination problems. We outline four mechanisms that capital allocation DAOs can use to allocate capital in different contexts: grants, prizes, tenders and in-house production. Each have implications for the transparency and accountability of capital allocation. Our findings help capital allocation DAOs make decisions about how to allocate shared capital across the Cosmos ecosystem.

The exchange theory of web3 governance

With Jason Potts, Darcy W E Allen, Aaron M. Lane and Trent MacDonald. Published in Kyklos,  June 2023. Working paper available on SSRN

Abstract: Blockchains have enabled innovation in distributed economic institutions, such as money (e.g., cryptocurrencies) and markets (e.g., decentralised exchanges), but also innovations in distributed governance, such as decentralised autonomous organisations. These innovations have generated academic interest in studying web3 governance, but as yet there is no general theory of web3 governance. In this paper, we draw on the contrast between a ‘romantic view’ of governance (characterised by consensus through community voting) and the ‘exchange view’ of governance from public choice theory (characterised by an entrepreneurial process of bargaining and exchange of voters under uncertainty). Our analysis is the first to argue that the latter ‘exchange view’ of governance is best to understand the dynamics of governance innovation in web3, providing the foundations for a new general theory of governance in this frontier field. We apply the ‘exchange view’ of governance to three case studies (Curve, Lido and Metagov), exploring how these projects enable pseudonymous, composable and permissionless governance processes to reveal value. Our approach helps illuminate how this emergent polycentric governance process can generate robustness in decentralised systems.

Large language models reduce agency costs


With Jason Potts, Darcy W E Allen, and Nataliya Ilyushina. Available on SSRN.

Large Language Models (LLMs) or generative AI have emerged as a new general-purpose technology in applied machine learning. These models are increasingly employed within firms to support a range of economic tasks. This paper investigates the economic value generated by the adoption and use of LLMs, which often occurs on an experimental basis, through two main channels. The first channel, already explored in the literature (e.g. Eloundou et al. 2023, Noy and Wang 2023), involves LLMs providing productive support akin to other capital investments or tools. The second, less examined channel concerns the reduction or elimination of agency costs in economic organisation due to the enhanced ability of economic actors to insource more tasks. This is particularly relevant for tasks that previously required contracting within or outside a firm. With LLMs enabling workers to perform tasks in which they had less specialisation, the costs associated with managing relationships and contracts decrease. This paper focuses on this second path of value creation through adoption of this innovative new general purpose technology. Furthermore, we examine the wider implications of the lower agency costs pathway on innovation, entrepreneurship and competition.

Why airdrop cryptocurrency tokens?

With Darcy WE Allen and Aaron M Lane. Published in the Journal of Business Research, 2023. Manuscript version available at SSRN

Abstract: A cryptocurrency token airdrop is a novel means of distributing rights over a blockchain project to a community of users and owners for free. The market value of these airdrop giveaways is often upwards of hundreds of millions of dollars. This paper considers why projects might choose this unusual and costly means of token distribution. It considers a selection of high-profile airdrops as case studies between 2014 and 2022. This is the first comprehensive analysis of the rationales and mechanisms of Web3 token airdrops. We find that two primary rationales for airdrops are marketing (to attract new users and to maintain a community) and decentralisation of ownership and control of a project (building community, providing regulatory protection, and enhancing security). The paper contributes to an understanding of business practice and strategy in the emerging cryptocurrency and blockchain industry.